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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Under any circumstances, does an indefinite term, at-will

employee, who has no written or implied employment contract, have
a right of action against his employer for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing upon being discharged?
2.

Assuming that an employer has a duty to exercise good

faith in terminating its employees, did the district court err in
failing to find that the evidence was insufficient to justify the
jury's verdict that Nordstrom did not act in good faith in discharging plaintiffs?
3.

Did the district court err in submitting to the jury the

issue of breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing when plaintiffs stated no such claim for relief in any of
their pleadings?
4.

Did the district court err in refusing to grant Nordstrom

a new trial on the basis of:
(a)

Insufficient evidence to support plaintiffs' claim;

(b) Unfair surprise resulting from its submission to the
jury the unpleaded claim of breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing;
(c) Failure to give any jury instructions concerning
dismissal for cause; and
(d) Failure to give jury instructions adequately defining good faith?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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5.

Should the district court's judgment be reversed and

vacated or should a remittitur be granted on the basis of improper
instructions concerning the measure of damages?
6.

Should Nordstrom be granted a remittitur or a new trial

on the basis of insufficient evidence to support the jury's damage
award?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Nordstrom believes the case of Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d
790 (Utah 1979), requires reversal of that portion of the district
court's judgment which is in favor of plaintiffs and against
Nordstrom and also of its order denying Nordstrom's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from that portion of the district court's judg-

ment favoring plaintiffs, and against Nordstrom.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In July 1982, plaintiffs commenced two separate actions, which

were later consolidated for all purposes, stating tort claims for
wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress
and defamation, and a contract claim for wrongful termination.
C82-5860, 2-19 and 290-291; R. C82-5828, 2-9 and 290-291.

R.

Shortly

after the cases were filed, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' tort claims for wrongful termination and intentional
infliction of emotional distress as failing to state claims upon
-2-
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which relief could be granted.

R. C82-5828, 103-104; R. C82-5860,

112-113.
Plaintiffs' remaining two claims for defamation and wrongful
termination based on a breach of contract theory were tried to a
jury on January 14-30, 1985. Nordstrom moved for directed verdict
on those claims at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case.

Tr. Vol.

V, 170. After all the evidence was in, the district court granted
Nordstrom's motion in part, dismissing plaintiffs' defamation
claims and finding plaintiffs had no employment contract upon
which to base a wrongful termination claim.1
99-100.

Tr. Vol. VIII,

Despite its contract finding, the district court ruled

that "there is a right of good faith dealing which is protected in
the courts," and that, therefore, plaintiffs could recover if
Nordstrom "violated that implied contract of good faith dealing"
in terminating plaintiffs' employment.

Tr. Vol. VIII, 101.

Accordingly, the district court instructed the jury on the
issue of whether Nordstrom breached an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.

The jury found in favor of plaintiffs,

awarding damages totaling $285,000.00.

R. C82-5828, 538. Judg-

ment in favor of the plaintiffs on the jury's special verdict was
entered on February 21, 1985.

R. C82-5860, 491-493.

The district

court subsequently denied Nordstrom's motion for judgment

The district court's judgment actually dismissed plaintiffs'
wrongful termination claim, as well as their defamation
claim. R. C82-5860, 491-493. The dismissal of those claims
should have left nothing to go to the jury.

-3-
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notwithstanding the verdict, new trial or remittitur.

Order

entered September 12, 1985, R. C82-5828, 2467-68. This appeal
followed.

Amended Notice of Appeal filed September 17, 1985, R.

C82-5828, 2475-77.
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Nordstrom formerly employed plaintiffs Dennis Knapp, Barbara
Knapp and Cathy Brehany at its Crossroads Plaza Store in Salt Lake
City.

Dennis Knapp was Nordstrom's first general manager .in

Utah.

Tr. Vol. I, 93, 116. He was responsible for opening the

Salt Lake City store and staffing it with buyers and other managers.

Tr. Vol. I, 116-117. Prior to coming to Salt Lake, he

managed a Nordstrom store in California.

Tr. Vol. I, 93. Barbara

Knapp and Cathy Brehany were both buyers in Nordstrom's Salt Lake
City store.
44-45.

Tr. Vol. I, 120; Tr. Vol. II, 131-132; Tr. Vol. Ill,

Nordstrom previously had employed both women in

California.

Tr. Vol. II, 123-124; Tr. Vol. Ill, 44.

It is undisputed that Nordstrom employed all three plaintiffs
for an indefinite term.

R. C82-5828, 508. After being hired,

plaintiffs each received a manual entitled Nordstrom History,
Policy and Regulations.
123; Tr. Vol. Ill, 41-42.

Tr. Vol. I, 79-80, Ex. P-l; Tr. Vol. II,
The manual provides that the following

conduct may result in immediate dismissal:
5.
Unbecoming conduct bringing reflection or
criticism upon the store and its personnel . . . .
6.
Entering or giving false testimony or information on employment application . . . .

-4-
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7.
. . . [V]iolation of any criminal law . . .
while in [Nordstrom's] employ.
Ex. P-l.

Each of the plaintiffs signed the following statement at

the end of the manual:

"I have read and understand the preceding

pages of the Nordstrom policy and regulation manual.

I understand

that my continued employment is contingent upon my adhering to the
policies stated therein."

Tr. Vol. I, 80-81; Tr. Vol. Ill, 42;

Tr. Vol. IX, 17.
On July 20, 1981, Nordstrom terminated the employment of all
three plaintiffs, as well as the employment of Michael Soule, who
is not a party to this action.
12-13.

R. C82-5828, 3; R. C82-5860, 5,

The events leading up to the terminations began with an

internal investigation of drug-related activities involving
Nordstrom employees in Southern California.

During the course of

the California investigation, Linda James, (Nordstrom*s Southern
California security manager), reported to Bart Triesch
(Nordstrom*s corporate security manager), that there were former
California Nordstrom employees, then working for Nordstrom in
Utah, who used drugs and had attended parties where drugs were
used.

Tr. Vol. IV, 106.

Upon receiving that information, Triesch contacted two security officers who had formerly worked in the Utah Division, Kathryn
McMahon and Mary Tasa, asking if they had knowledge of drug use
among Nordstrom employees in Utah.

Tr. Vol. IV, 106.

Both women

gave Triesch oral, and later written, reports of such conduct.
Tr. Vol. IV, 107-108, 113-114; Tr. Vol. V, 114, 117.
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Mary Tasa reported to Triesch that Nordstrom employees had
used drugs at a birthday party at Michael Soule's house, and that
she had overheard a comment at a Christmas party at the Knapps'
house indicating that marijuana was being smoked in the basement.
Ex. D-27.

Tasa also reported that Cathy Brehany had related to

her that she occasionally "snorted" cocaine, but "didn't believe
in coming to work high and particularly in not doing any drugrelated activities with co-workers outside of work."

Ex. D-27.

Kathryn McMahon told Triesch she had observed Nordstrom
employees smoking marijuana at a birthday party for Michael
Soule.

Tr. Vol. IV, 107-108. McMahon also said Soule told her he

had sent money to California to buy cocaine and many people
working for Nordstrom were waiting for it.

Tr. Vol. IV, 108.

In

addition, McMahon's written statement listed a number of Salt Lake
City Nordstrom employees who used illegal drugs, including Dennis
Knapp and Cathy Brehany.2

Ex. D-26.

In her written statement,

McMahon also reported that she saw Dennis Knapp smoke marijuana at
Michael Soule's house.

Ex. D-26.

Triesch passed the information Tasa and McMahon gave him to
his immediate supervisor, Gary Baughn.

Tr. Vol. IV, 104, 112-113,

In argument, plaintiffs' counsel questioned whether McMahon
prepared her written statement, which was undated, prior to
plaintiffs' terminations. Bart Triesch testified she did
prepare the statement prior to the terminations. Tr., Vol.
IV, 104. McMahon testified she wrote the statement "after
people were already dismissed," but then added, "I don't know
when they were fired." Tr., Vol. V, 117. From the evidence
at trial, McMahon's statement could have been the only source
of a list of names which plaintiffs' counsel argued was in the
possession of Nordstrom management prior to the terminations.
Tr. IX, 12-13, 23, 34.

-6-
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118.

Triesch and Baughn then discussed that information with John

Nordstrom, Nordstrom"s co-chairman of the board.

Tr. Vol. IV,

113, 118, 156-157.
In an effort to confirm the information in Tasa's and
McMahon's reports, Mr. Nordstrom contacted Mary Kay Smithmeyer, a
trusted employee who had worked in the Utah division.
IV, 166, 211-212; Tr. Vol. VI, 42.

Tr. Vol.

Smithmeyer told Mr. Nordstrom

she had been present at a picnic and at least two other parties at
which Dennis Knapp and other Nordstrom employees were present
where she smelled marijuana, and that Dennis Knapp was aware of
what was going on at at least two of those occasions.
IV, 167, 213-217; Tr. Vol. VI, 46-54.

Tr. Vol.

She also reported having

overheard a number of conversations in a stock room in the Salt
Lake City store where people said that Cathy Brehany could get
drugs.

Tr. Vol. VI, 58.

John Nordstrom testified that Smithmeyer

told him Brehany "had a source for drugs."

Tr. Vol. IV, 23-4.

John Nordstrom also discussed the drug problem among Utah
employees with Betsy Sanders, Nordstrom's general manager in
Southern California.

Tr. Vol. IV, 156, 196-197.

Sanders

confirmed that she had heard reports of Michael Soule transporting
drugs to Nordstrom employees in Utah.

Tr. Vol. V, 222.

She told

Mr. Nordstrom that Cathy Brehany had been a poor employee in
California after being "tapped" to go to Utah, and that she had
advised Dennis Knapp he should reconsider taking her to Utah.
Vol. IV, 217, 228-229; Tr. Vol. V, 224-225.

She also told

Mr. Nordstrom that in California Cathy Brehany regularly

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Tr.

associated with persons who boasted about their drug involvement
and, in particular, had "championed" one such individual after
Nordstrom had fired him for stealing a customer's wallet. Tr.
Vol. IV, 229; Tr. Vol. V, 222-224, 226.
John Nordstrom discussed the information he received from
Triesch, Smithmeyer and Sanders concerning employee drug involvement in Utah with the company's executive committee, consisting of
himself, James Nordstrom, Bruce Nordstrom, Robert Bender and Jack
McMillan.

Tr. Vol. IV, 165-166; Vol. V, 38. Based on that infor-

mation, together with James Nordstrom's report of similar information he received from Betsy Sanders, the committee decided to terminate the employment of the plaintiffs, Dennis Knapp, Barbara
Knapp and Cathy Brehany, as well as the employment of Michael
Soule.

Tr. Vol. IV, 165-166, 177; Vol. V, 19, 31.

Thereupon, on

July 20, 1981, James Nordstrom and Robert Bender traveled to Salt
Lake City and discharged plaintiffs and Soule.

Tr. Vol. V, 26,

29, 44, 47.
Plaintiffs' admissions at trial supplemented, and in most
respects confirmed, the information upon which the management committee acted.

The evidence showed that Dennis Knapp's problems

began from the day he started working with the company.

He

admitted signing his employment application, declaring it to be
true and correct, even though the application stated he received
an Honorable Discharge from the Air Force when in fact he had
received an Undesirable Discharge.
D-17.

Tr. Vol. II, 23, 25; Ex.

The application also stated he had never been "arrested"

-8-
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when in fact, while in the Air Force, he had been charged with,
and had pleaded guilty to, a criminal violation.

Tr. Vol. II, 25;

Ex. D-17. Dennis Knapp also admitted using marijuana and cocaine
while employed by Nordstrom.
48-49.

Tr. Vol. I, 98-100; Tr. Vol. II,

He specifically testified that he used marijuana and

cocaine in the presence of vendors while representing Nordstrom on
buying trips in San Diego, Seattle and New York.
48-49.

Tr. Vol. II,

He admitted that Betsy Sanders confronted him about such

drug use, and that he concealed the extent of his drug use from
her.

Tr. Vol. II, 44. He further admitted that, while he was

general manager in Utah, he was aware of drug use by his employees
and that several employees regularly used marijuana in his
presence, but that he did nothing to discourage such use, even
though he recognized it to be illegal.

Tr. Vol. II, 32-35.

There

was also unrefuted testimony that Dennis Knapp lied about his
wife's drug use to one of his employees, Nancy Love, even after
his termination from Nordstrom.

Tr. Vol. Ill, 109-110.

Barbara Knapp admitted regularly using marijuana in Salt Lake
City in the presence of other Nordstrom employees.
83.

Tr. Vol. Ill,

She also admitted using marijuana while representing

Nordstrom on buying trips in New York in the presence of vendors
and other Nordstrom employees.

Tr. Vol. Ill, 86, 88.

Although Cathy Brehany repeatedly denied using or selling
drugs herself, she admitted regularly associating with drug users
and being with them while they used illegal drugs.
139-140, 151; Vol. Ill, 6-9.

Tr. Vol. II,

Brehany admitted having offered to

-9-
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introduce several of her friends, all Nordstrom employees, to Jody
Bernafo, the owner of a bar in Park City where drugs were reported
to be widely available, for the purpose of their obtaining cocaine
from him.

Tr. Vol. II, 140-141; Vol. Ill, 10-14.

Two of the

persons to whom she made this offer, Mary Tasa and Kathryn
McMahon, were the very security officers who initially reported
employee drug use in Salt Lake City to Bart Triesch.
Despite the substantial evidence of plaintiffs' misconduct,
their status as at-will employees, and the district court's dismissal of all their pleaded claims, the district court nevertheless submitted to the jury the claim that Nordstrom breached an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The jury

returned a verdict in plaintiffs' favor on that claim, awarding
damages totaling $285,000.

R. C82-5828, 538.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

This court should reverse and vacate that portion of the

district court's judgment that is in favor of plaintiffs and
against Nordstrom because:
(a)

In Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979),

the Utah Supreme Court held that an indefinite-term employee has
no right of action against his employer for breach of the employment contract upon being discharged.

Hence, since plaintiffs were

all indefinite term employees, it was error for the district court
to submit to the jury the issue of whether Nordstrom breached an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in discharging
them.

Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court should follow the large
-10-
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majority of states who have rejected a bad faith exception to the
at-will rule, based upon a variety of compelling considerations.
Even those states that have recognized a bad faith exception, have
done so under certain limited circumstances not present in this
case.
(b) The evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, since Nordstrom"s actions do not constitute bad faith under
any court's ruling.
(c) The issue of whether Nordstrom breached an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was neither raised in the
pleadings nor tried, and therefore should not have been submitted
to the jury.
2.

In the alternative, this court should reverse and grant

Nordstrom a new trial because:
(a) The evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict.
(b) Submission of the issue of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to the jury, which had not been
pleaded nor tried, constituted unfair surprise to Nordstrom.
(c) The district court failed to give any jury instructions concerning dismissal for cause, and there was substantial
evidence of conduct justifying plaintiffs' terminations.
(d) The district court failed to give jury instructions
adequately defining the concept of "good faith.'1
3.

This court should reverse and vacate that portion of the

district court's judgment favoring plaintiffs and against
Nordstrom or order a remittitur of damages to $0.00 because the

-11-
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district court, improperly instructed the jury concerning the
measure of damages. Under the correct measure, plaintiffs are
entitled to no damages.
4.

This court should order a remittitur or grant Nordstrom a

new trial because, even if the district court's instruction concerning the measure of damages is correct, the damages awarded by
the jury are substantially in excess of any amount supported by
the evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND
VACATE THAT PORTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S
JUDGMENT THAT IS IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS AND
AGAINST NORDSTROM.
That portion of the district court's judgment favoring plaintiffs and against Nordstrom is in error and should be reversed and
vacated for the following reasons: First, under established Utah
law, since plaintiffs were indefinite-term, at-will employees,
Nordstrom had the unfettered right to discharge them at any time
for any reason.

Second, even assuming that Utah law now recog-

nizes a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law
to justify the jury's verdict.

Third, a claim for relief for

breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was
neither pleaded nor tried, and could not properly be raised for
the first time at the conclusion of the trial.

-12-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

Plaintiffs Had No Right of Action Against Nordstrom Upon
Being Discharged.
1.

Utah's at-will rule bars plaintiffs' wrongful
termination claim.

Even though plaintiffs' wrongful termination claim sounded in
contract, plaintiffs nonetheless freely admitted at trial that
they were employed by Nordstrom for an indefinite term.
082-5828,508.

R.

The long-standing law in Utah concerning the con-

tract rights of an indefinite term employee upon being discharged
was most recently stated in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792
(Utah 1979):
The general rule concerning personal employment contracts is, in the absence of some further express or
implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment
or of a good consideration in addition to the services
contracted to be rendered, the contract is no more than
an indefinite general hiring which is terminable at the
will of either party. . . .
When an individual is hired for an indefinite time
he has no right of action against his employer for breach
of the employment contract upon being discharged.
[Emphasis added.]
Accord e.g., Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978);
Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 P.2d 210,
211 (1957).
In Bihlmaier, this court recognized only two situations in
which the employer's right to discharge an employee may be
limited:

(1) where there is "some further express or implied

stipulation as to the duration of the employment" or (2) where
there is "a good consideration in addition to the services contracted to be rendered."
792.

Bihlmaier v. Carson, supra, 603 P.2d at

Plaintiffs have never maintained that either situation is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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present in this case.

Hence, as the district court correctly

stated with respect to plaintiffs' employment:
ment at will."

"It's an employ-

Tr. Vol. V, 192. Plaintiffs therefore had no

right of action upon being discharged.
Because the plaintiffs were at-will employees, the district
court's submission to the jury of the issue of breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not just an
extension of, but was contrary to, Utah law. Addressing the
specific issue presented in the instant case, in accordance with
Bihlmaier and other earlier decisions of the Utah Supreme court,
the United States District Court for the District of Utah held
that an at-will employee may not maintain a claim for breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Utah law
upon being discharged.

Heward v. Western Electric Co., Case No.

C-81-0904W (D. Utah, Memorandum Decision and Order filed
February 18, 1983), aff'd 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3423, 3425 (10th Cir.
1984).

Judge David K. Winder's Order in Heward states that such a

claim is not "legally actionable, especially where the plaintiff's
employment contract is indefinite as to duration and terminable at
will."

Id.

More recently, in Amos v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791,
829 (D. Utah 1984), Judge Winder refused to allow a wrongful discharge claim based on alleged religious discrimination, concluding
that engrafting any exception on the traditional at-will rule
would change Utah law:

-14-
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[T]he long history of the Utah Supreme Court's recognition of the terminable-at-will doctrine, the language the
court has used in dismissing those cases and the failure
of the court to even suggest that it might recognize an
exception to that rule lead this court to the conclusion
that the recognition of an exception to the terminableat-will would be a change in Utah law. [Citations
omitted.]
The district judge below also apparently recognized that
allowing plaintiffs to maintain a claim for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing constituted a significant
departure from established Utah law.
be stepping into a new era."

He stated that doing so "may

Tr. Vol. VIII, 101. He further

described his allowance of such a claim as a "new furrow . . .
being drawn," and as a "new area in the law in this day. . . . "
Tr. Vol. VIII, 102, 103.
Thus, in submitting the issue of whether Nordstrom breached an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the jury, and
in denying Nordstrom's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the district court acted contrary to well-established
Utah law.
action.

Under Utah law, the plaintiffs have no right of

Accordingly, this court should reverse and vacate the

district court's judgment.
2.

A claim for bad faith termination of an employment
relationship should not be allowed in this case.
a.

The Utah Supreme Court has never recognized a claim
for bad faith termination of employment.

Prior to Bihlmaier, this court considered whether a claim for
bad faith termination of an insurance agent was actionable in Mann
v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978).

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In

Mann, the plaintiff, an insurance agent, brought an action for
damages against his employer for wrongful termination of his
agency contract.

The plaintiff in Mann argued that even though a

party might have a right to terminate a contract without cause, he
must nevertheless exercise the right in good faith.

The Supreme

Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, stating:
Whatever the justification for judicial remaking of
the party's contracts in these extreme cases may have
been, it cannot be adopted as a general precept of contract law that, whenever one party to a contract can show
injury flowing from the exercise of a contract right by
the other, a basis for relief will somehow be devised by
the courts.
Id. at 464. The court added:
This court has previously demonstrated strong reluctance to rewrite contracts for litigants because the consequences of enforcement of the contracts they signed
seemed unfair.
Id.

The court then held it was unnecessary to decide in the con-

text of that case whether exercise of a contract right in bad
faith is t>r is not actionable, since in that case there was insufficient evidence of bad faith to go to the jury, where the plaintiff's evidence of bad faith "consistted] entirely of evidence of
his satisfactory performance and the lack of good cause for termination." J^d.
Other than Mann, we are aware of no case in which the Utah
Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue of the actionability of a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith.
However, the sweeping language of Bihlmaier, that an indefiniteterm employee has no right of action upon being discharged, necessarily precludes such a claim.

As shown above, the United States
-16-
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District Court in Heward v. Western Electric Co., supra. Case No.
C-81-0904W (D. Utah, Memorandum Decision and Order filed
February 18, 1983), specifically held that such a claim is barred
by Utah's at-will rule.
b.

A majority of states have rejected a bad faith
exception to the at-will rule.

While the courts of a few states have created an exception to
the at-will rule by allowing recovery for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under certain limited circumstances (none of which, as shown below, are present in this
case), a decided majority of states still have categorically
refused to do so. New York recently rejected a claim for breach
of an implied covenant of good faith in Murphy v. American Home
Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86
(1983).

There, the court noted that in appropriate circumstances,

an obligation of good faith and fair dealing on the part of a
party to a contract may be implied and, if implied, will be
enforced.

As the court observed, however, "in such instances the

implied obligation is in aid and furtherance of other terms of the
agreement of the parties."

_Id. The court then refused to impose

such an obligation with respect to the right to terminate an
at-will employment relationship, stating:
No obligation can be implied, however, which would
be inconsistent with other terms of the contractual
relationship. Thus, in the case now before us, plaintiff's employment was at will, a relationship in which
the law accords the employer an unfettered right to terminate the employment at any time. In the context of
such an employment it would be incongruous to say that an
inference may be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to a position which would be destructive of his right of
termination. The parties may by express agreement limit
or restrict the employer's right of discharge, but to
imply such a limitation from the existence of an
unrestricted right would be internally inconsistent.
Id. at 237.
Based on similar reasoning, the Arizona Supreme Court, in
Waqenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3166
(Ariz. 1985), also recently refused to impose any good faith
limitation on the employer's right to terminate an at-will
employee:
[T]he implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing projects [sic] the right of the parties to an
agreement to receive the benefits of the agreement that
they have entered into. The denial of a party's right to
those benefits, whatever they are, will breach the duty
of good faith implicit in the contract. Thus, the relevant inquiry always will focus on the contract itself to
determine what the parties did agree to. In the case of
an employment-at-will contract, it may be said that the
parties have agreed, for example, that the employee will
do the work required by the employer and that the
employer will provide the necessary working conditions
and pay the employee for work done. What cannot be said
is that one of the agreed benefits to the at-will
employee is a guarantee of continued employment or
tenure. The very nature of the at-will agreement precludes any claim for a prospective benefit. Either
employer or employee may terminate the contract at any
time.
Id. at 3177-78.
Likewise, in Ericksen v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Co., 119
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3621 (N.D. 111. 1984), the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, applying Illinois
law, dismissed the claim of an at-will employee for wrongful
termination based on the alleged breach of an implied covenant of
good faith, stating that the good faith obligation "does not

-18-
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create an independent cause of action."

Ld. at 3623.

The court

added:
The principle of good faith comes into play in defining
and modifying duties which grow out of specific contract
terms and obligations. It is a derivative principle."
Since no specific contractual obligation is alleged here,
the good faith principle does not come into play as a
cause of action.
Id. [Citations omitted.]
In another recent case relied on heavily by plaintiffs in
their argument against Nordstrom's motion for directed verdict,
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081
(1984), the Washington Supreme Court also refused to create a bad
faith exception to the at-will doctrine, stating:
We do not adopt [the bad faith] exception. An
employer's interest in running his business as he sees
fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee
in maintaining his employment and this exception does not
strike the proper balance. We believe that
To imply into each employment contract a duty
to terminate in good faith would . . . subject each
discharge to judicial incursions into the amorphous
concept of bad faith. . . .
Moreover, while an employer may agree to restrict or
limit his right to discharge an employee, to imply such a
lestriction on that right from the existence of a contractual right, which, by its terms has no restrictions,
is internally inconsistent. Such an intrusion into the
employment relationship is merely a judicial substitute
for collective bargaining which is more appropriately
left to the legislative process.
685 P.2d at 1086-87.

[Citations omitted.]

Many other courts have reached the same conclusion.

The

Florida District Court of Appeal, in Muller v. Stromberq Carlson
Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. App. 1983), refused to adopt a bad
faith exception to the at-will rule.

Although it had previously
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acknowledged an obligation of good faith with respect to termination of a definite term contract, the court observed that the
obligation of good faith could not be deemed to create a contract
for a definite term, and therefore did not apply in an at-will
contract.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected a bad faith exception to
the at-will doctrine, stating:
We are not persuaded that protection of employees
requires such an intrusion on the employment relationship
or such an imposition on the courts.
Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 374, 652 P.2d
625, 629 (1982).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also held that employment contracts contain no implied duty to terminate only in good faith,
stating that it was,
unnecessary and unwarranted for courts to become arbiters
of any termination that may have a tinge of bad faith
attached. Imposing a good faith duty to terminate would
unduly restrict an employer's discretion in managing the
work force.
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 564, 335 N.W.2d
834, 838 (1983).
An earlier Arizona case reaffirming the at-will doctrine, and
refusing to recognize a bad faith exception, noted that, "[t]he
effect of adhering to such a rule [allowing a bad faith exception]
would be to expose an employer to a lawsuit every time he discharges an employee with a contract terminable at will."

Daniel

v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 324, 620 P.2d 699, 703 (1980).
In sum, a majority of courts have rejected a bad faith exception to the at-will rule for a number of reasons, including:
-20-
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(1) Reluctance to rewrite contracts or to create a judicial
substitute for the collective bargaining process;
(2) The inconsistency inherent in imposing a contract term by
implication that is contrary to the unfettered contract right to
terminate permitted by the at-will doctrine;
(3) The fact that the good faith duty cannot create an
independent cause of action, but must be in aid of some specific
contract term which does not exist in an indefinite term employment where neither employer nor employee makes any promise of
future performance;
(4) The necessarily amorphous nature of a good faith standard
and the resulting difficulty in its application;
(5) The undue restraint necessarily imposed by such a
requirement on the employer's discretion in managing his work
force; and
(6) The likelihood that such a rule would expose the employer
to a lawsuit every time he discharges an employee with a contract
terminable at will.
All of these reasons are sound and should be given controlling
weight by this court.
c.

Those states that have recognized a bad faith exception have done so under circumstances not present in
the instant case.

In general, the few states that have recognized a bad faith
exception have done so under circumstances not present in the
instant case.

The positions of the few states which created the
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exception, and^ which were relied on by plaintiffs below, may be
summarized as follows:
(1) New Hampshire.

The bad faith exception applies "only in

a situation where an employee is discharged because he performed
an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do that
which public policy would condemn."

Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co..

120 N.H. 295. 414 A.2d 1273. 1294 (1980). limiting the holding of
the seminal case Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.. 114 N.H. 130. 316 A.2d
549 (1974).
(2) Massachusetts.

The employee's right to make a claim for

lack of good faith arises where the employer intends to benefit
financially at the employee's expense, or the employer's reason
for the discharge was contrary to public policy.

Siles v.

Travenol Laboratories. Inc.. 13 Mass. App. 354. 433 N.E.2d 103
(1982). explaining Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.. 373
Mass. 96. 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (1977).
(3) California.
California courts have repeatedly considered situations where violation of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing has been alleged as a result of a
"termination without good cause." The courts have
refused to recognize any such cause of action based on
that naked covenant alone. As indicated above, the
rulings of those courts were always predicated upon other
public policy grounds, statutory violation, or express
(or clearly implied) contract grounds, or upon a combination of elements (e.g. especially longevity of service
together with some added element (Cleary) 18 years and
company policies; (Pugh) 32 years and company policies,
faithful service and lack of criticism). [Emphasis in
original.]
Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 448,
203 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1984), referring to Cleary v. American
-22-
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Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1980)
and Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917 (1981).
None of the circumstances which gave rise to the bad faith
exception exists in the instant case.

As explained in more detail

below, there was no evidence whatever that plaintiffs' terminations violated any public policy, that Nordstrom intended to
benefit financially from plaintiffs* discharges, or that Nordstrom
violated any statute, contract or company policy in discharging
plaintiffs.

Therefore, none of the circumstances exist in the

instant case that would justify application of the bad-faith
exception, even in the states that have made the most significant
departures from the traditional at-will rule.
d.

This court should reject the bad faith exception.

This court should follow the majority of courts in this
country and reject a bad-faith exception to the at-will rule.
Those courts, as outlined above, have presented many sound reasons
for refusing to do so.

Even those courts which have recognized

such a claim have not done so under the circumstances of the
instant case.
The instant case is a compelling illustration of the problems
inherent in creating a claim for breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.

The plaintiffs, as the district

court ruled, were indefinite term, at-will employees.

Nordstrom

violated no public policy, statute or contract term in discharging
them and had no financial motive for their terminations.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Rather,

as described in the Statement of Facts above, prior to discharging
plaintiffs, Nordstrom's top management had personally undertaken
an investigation of plaintiffs' conduct and confirmed by independent witnesses the existence of facts which they believed necessitated plaintiffs' terminations.

Nordstrom's efforts to eradicate

a serious drug problem in its work force should have been
applauded; instead it was slapped with a $285,000 verdict against
it.
If this court affirms the jury's verdict and adopts the good
faith requirement as the law of this state, it will place
employers in the untenable position of justifiably fearing similar
results when taking employment actions believed necessary to correct serious employment problems.
result.

The court should not allow this

The holding of the district court should be reversed and

plaintiffs' claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing be dismissed as failing to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under Utah law.
3.

Any change in the at-will rule should be made by the
legislature.

As many courts have recognized, if the at-will rule is to be
changed, the legislature, not the courts, is best suited to evaluate the impact of such a change, discern the public will, and
make that determination.

See, e.g., Ising v. Barnes Hospital, 674

S.W.2d 623, 625-26 (Mo. App. 1984); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Murphy v. American
Home Products, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86
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(1983); Molder v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 665 S.W.2d 175,
177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983); Poirier v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 116
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2086, 2089 (Me. Super. Ct. 1983).

The at-will rule

has long governed most employer-employee relationships.

Over the

years both employers and employees undoubtedly have made countless
employment decisions in reliance on the rule, whose meaning, until
now, has been clear.

Thus, changing the rule would unquestionably

have far-reaching, unforeseeable consequences.

As one court

argued, the legislature has greater resources and procedural means
than the courts to, among other things, investigate and anticipate
the impact of imposing new liability; establish standards applicable to the multifarious types of employment and various circumstances of discharge; and implement a change in the rights and
obligations forged in reliance on the rule so as to best accommodate competing interests, perhaps by making the changes prospective only.

Murphy v. American Home Products, supra, 461 N.Y.S.2d

at 235-36.
The Utah legislature has considered the employment relationship and has seen fit to prohibit the denial of employment opportunities only under certain limited circumstances.

The Anti-

Discrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-1 et seq. (1953 as
amended), prohibits employment decisions made on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, age, national origin or
handicap.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-37-16 (1953 as amended) forbids

employers to deny or terminate employment because of refusal to
submit to polygraph examination.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-20-8 (1953
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as amended) prohibits certain unfair employment practices by
employers and labor unions.

Significantly, although the Utah

legislature has concerned itself with the rights of employees, no
legislation has altered the traditional at-will rule in any way,
except as may result under the above situations involving violations of important public policies.
In sum, the district court's submission to the jury of a claim
based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was
contrary to well-established Utah law.

To affirm the district

court's decision, this court must overrule Bihlmaier.

So doing

would transform law that is certain and clear into law that will
be fraught with uncertainty and, consequently, destined to launch
a wave of litigation and to have other far-reaching and unforeseeable effects.

This court should defer to the legislature, which

has the best vantage point from which to make such sweeping
changes in the law, and should reverse the district court.
B.

Even if this Court Recognizes the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, as a Matter of Law there is
Insufficient Evidence to Justify the Jury's Verdict.

Utah case law defines "bad faith" as "a thing done dishonestly
and not merely negligently . . . [and] as that which imports a
dishonest purpose and implies wrongdoing for some motive of selfinterest."

Research Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 690 P.2d

1130, 1132 (Utah 1984), citing Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Zions
First National Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 869, 870 (1968).

As

discussed above, other cases hold that bad faith may exist where
an employer discharges an employee in violation of public policy,
-26-
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statute or contract or where there is an improper financial motive
for the discharge.

On the other hand, in Mann v. American Western

Life Insurance Co., supra, 568 P.2d at 461, the Utah Supreme Court
held that bad faith does not exist where the sole evidence of bad
faith is that an employee has performed satisfactorily for an
extended period of time, and there is no good cause for termination.
Under these definitions of bad faith, viewing the facts most
favorably to plaintiffs, as a matter of law the evidence does not
support a finding that Nordstrom acted in bad faith.

There was no

suggestion at trial that Nordstrom acted out of a dishonest
purpose or had some motive of self-interest.

There also was no

evidence of a violation of public policy, contract or statute or
of an improper financial motive, or breach of public policy.
Rather than relying on any of these grounds, at closing argument, plaintiffs' counsel argued that Nordstrom acted in bad faith
primarily on the basis that Nordstrom's investigation was unsatisfactory.

Plaintiffs' counsel also argued that the terminations

were in bad faith because plaintiffs had performed well in their
jobs for a substantial period of time and other employees reported
as drug users were not fired.

With respect to Barbara Knapp,

counsel argued that her termination was in bad faith based on Jim
Nordstrom's testimony that she was discharged because she was
Dennis' wife and a management-level employee, and he thought it
would be a problem for the Utah division if she remained.
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None of plaintiffs1 arguments supports a finding of bad
faith.

Even assuming there is a factual basis for the arguments,

the conduct complained of simply has never been held to give rise
to liability for bad faith.

With respect to the quality of

Nordstrom*s investigation, plaintiffs' complaints are baseless in
the first instance because the law does not require any investigation prior to termination.

All that is required is an honest pur-

pose and a reasonable belief that sufficient cause for discharge
existed.

Research Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, supra, 690 P.2d

at 1132; Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d
1276 (1982).

Indeed, public policy should allow an employer to

take action with respect to its work force without being required
to engage in police work.

See, Buckmon v. Wilmington Dry Goods,

115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3156 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
In any case, the facts in the instant case establish that
Nordstrom undertook reasonable efforts to confirm the existence of
a drug problem among its Utah employees which justified the action
taken.

Nordstrom management received four independent and cor-

roborative witness statements regarding Cathy Brehany's drug
involvement:

the oral or written statements of Kathryn McMahon,

Mary Tasa, Mary Kay Smithmeyer and Betsy Sanders.

Tr. Vol. IV,

111, 117, 234; Tr. Vol. V, 222-223; Tr. Vol. VI, 58; Ex. D-26 and
D-27.

Moreover, the three witnesses who had been in Utah, Mary

Kay Smithmeyer, Kathryn McMahon and Mary Tasa, all confirmed
Dennis Knapp's knowledge of employee drug activities and his
failure to take any steps to deal with the problem.

-28-
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Tr. Vol. IV,

111-112, 167, 213-217; Tr. Vol. V, 114-115; Tr. Vol. VI, 46-54;
Ex. D-26 and D-27.

Given Dennis Knapps' position, it was

reasonable to believe that his wife's remaining could cause
problems in the Utah division.

In short, Nordstrom management

received substantial cumulative information which justified their
reasonable belief that sufficient cause for plaintiffs'
termination existed.
Plaintiffs' next argument was that Nordstrom acted in bad
faith because they were good employees who satisfactorily performed their duties, and were terminated without cause.

Even if

true, the Utah Supreme Court held in Mann that such evidence does
not constitute "bad faith."

586 P.2d at 461. And in fact, even

though plaintiffs had in many respects satisfactorily performed
their duties, there was, as shown in the Statement of Facts and
the discussion below, cause for termination in accordance with the
Nordstrom policy manual.
Plaintiffs' argument that Nordstrom acted "unfairly" in terminating the plaintiffs' employment while other employees using
drugs remained with the company also provides no basis for a finding of bad faith.

Aside from the fact that the argument inappro-

priately focused the jury on a lay concept of "fairness" rather
the district court's instructions defining "bad faith," the argument improperly called upon the jury to substitute its judgment
for that of management in deciding whether proper actions were
taken to correct a difficult, and potentially devastating situation within the company.

See, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., supra,
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116 C.A. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (1981) ("Care must be
taken not to interfere with the legitimate exercise of managerial
discretion.")
Even if, as plaintiffs' counsel argued, management selected
four people to discharge as examples to others, the freedom to do
so should be within their discretion.

Law enforcement officials

have the discretion to grant immunity to some in order to obtain
testimony to convict others.

The law is clear, even in states

most favorable to employees, that in making decisions concerning
termination of an employee, the employer must be allowed substantial scope for the exercise of subjective judgment, especially
where the employee occupies a sensitive managerial position, as
did plaintiffs.

Id.

That discretion must extend to the decision

of which employees, if any, to terminate.
Plaintiffs' argument rests on a shaky factual footing in any
case.

While plaintiffs were able to troop their friends to the

witness stand at trial to regale the jury with tales of widespread
drug use among Nordstrom employees, there was little, if any, evidence that such information was available to top Nordstrom management at the time of plaintiffs' terminations.

As shown in the

Statement of Facts, there was evidence that Nordstrom management
in Seattle received repeated reports of general employee drug use
of which Dennis Knapp was aware and uniform reports of Michael
Soule's and Cathy Brehany's drug involvement.

Concerning the

specific involvement of other employees, there was far less information.
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The reason for the relative dearth of information concerning
the conduct of other specific employees is obvious: drug use is
illegal and effort was made to cover it up. One of plaintiffs'
friends, Steve Heck, after blithely testifying of his drug
involvement and that of other Nordstrom employees, admitted that
such conduct was kept "hush, hush."

Tr. Vol. Ill, 158. Dennis

Knapp did not even deny Nancy Love's testimony that he lied to her
about his wife Barbara's drug use even after they were
discharged.

Tr. Vol. Ill, 109-110.

In any case, so long as Nordstrom acted out of honest motives
and reasonable belief, it did not act in bad faith.

There was no

evidence whatever that Nordstrom acted for any purpose other than
to correct what it perceived to be a serious problem among its
employees.

Even dismissing Barbara Knapp because she was Dennis'

wife was within the proper bounds of management discretion due to
the likelihood of serious morale problems among employees if she
remained.

(As shown below, there was good cause for her dismissal

in any event.)
Thus, none of the facts recognized by the Utah Supreme Court
or other courts as establishing bad faith are present in this
case.

Plaintiffs' inappropriate and repeated emphasis on "fair-

ness" in closing argument served merely to confuse the jurors and
to encourage them to substitute their judgment for that of
Nordstrom management in evaluating whether the terminations were
"fair."

Because the evidence was insufficient to establish bad
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faith as defined by Utah law, the district court erred in denying
Nordstrom's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
its judgment against Nordstrom should be reversed.
C.

The Judgment Should be Reversed Since it Grants Relief on
an Issue that was Neither Raised in the Pleadings nor
Specifically Tried.

At the time this case went to trial, two pleaded claims for
relief remained:

a defamation claim and a claim for wrongful ter-

mination based on contract.
both claims.

The trial court's judgment dismissed

Hence, in submitting to the jury the issue of

whether Nordstrom breached an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, the court presented to the jury an issue that was
neither raised in the pleadings nor specifically tried.
This court has recently stated the following with regard to
the grant of relief on matters outside the pleadings:
It is a rule of longstanding that every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has
not demanded such relief in his pleadings. However,
findings which are at variance with the claims of both
parties are not favored and are carefully scrutinized on
review. Although Rule 54(c)(1) permits relief on grounds
not pleaded, that rule does not go so far as to authorize
the granting of relief on issues neither raised nor tried.
Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah
1984).
In this case, as part of their breach of contract claim,
plaintiffs alleged that Nordstrom breached a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in that there was no good cause for plaintiffs' discharge.

Plaintiff Brehany in her Amended Complaint

alleges:
-32-
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The defendant corporation by and through its officers or
agents breached its duty of good faith in that the Plaintiff was wrongfully discharged even though she had not
violated any policy or regulation contained within the
written provisions of the "History, Policy & Regulations"
pamphlet published by the Defendant Corporation to the
employees of the Defendants' far flung operations in
Utah, Washington, Oregon, California and Hawaii.
R. C82-5828, 108.

In their Complaint, the Knapps make substan-

tially the same allegation.

R. C82-5860, 4-5, 12.

In accordance with the issue framed by plaintiffs in their
pleadings, Nordstrom requested jury instructions which would have
required the jury to determine whether in fact plaintiffs violated
the rules of the Nordstrom policy manual, and therefore were properly discharged for cause.

R. C82-5828, 642-643. The court

declined to give such instructions, but rather submitted instructions to the jury requiring the jury to analyze the motives and
beliefs of Nordstrom management —

a wholly different issue than

the good faith issue raised in the pleadings.
Indeed, at the time the district court ordered that the issue
of breach of an implied covenant and fair dealing go to the jury,
neither plaintiffs nor defendants had submitted any instructions
specifically addressing that issue.

The court had to recess until

the following morning to allow the parties to prepare instructions.

Tr. Vol. VIII, 105-107.

The next morning, Norsdstrom sub-

mitted instructions pursuant to the court's order, R. C82-5828,
579-595, but objected to giving any such instructions as being
contrary to law and as addressing an issue that was never
pleaded.

R. C82-5828, 580; Tr. Vol. IX, 89, 91.

Plaintiffs at no
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time requested.any instructions even remotely resembling those
finally given to the jury.
Based on the pleadings, Nordstrom, at trial, focused its presentation on plaintiff's conduct and therefore, for example,
elected not to bring James and John Nordstrom from Seattle to Salt
Lake City to testify after plaintiffs read their depositions to
the jury.

When the case was submitted to the jury, however, for

the first time the conduct of Nordstrom management, and not that
of plaintiffs, was put in issue, thereby effectively denying
Nordstrom its right to trial by jury by denying it the opportunity
to present its case with knowledge of the claims against it.

In

so doing, the trial court improperly submitted to the jury an
issue neither raised in the pleadings nor tried.

Accordingly, the

jury's verdict and the judgment entered thereon should be set
aside by this court.
POINT II
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
SHOULD REVERSE AND GRANT NORDSTROM A NEW TRIAL.
In the alternative, Nordstrom urges that if this court does
not reverse the district court for its denial of Nordstrom's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, then the court
should at least reverse the district court for its error in denying Nordstrom's motion for a new trial.

The appropriate grounds

for granting a new trial are set forth in Rule 59, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, and include, among others, the following:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
-34-
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abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
* * *

(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against.
* * *

(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
Nordstrom is entitled to a new trial in this case based on
each of the above grounds.
A.

Nordstrom is Entitled to a New Trial Because There is
Insufficient Evidence to Justify the Verdict.

The standard of review of a trial court's denial of a motion
for a new trial as follows:
Where the trial court has denied the motion for new
trial, its decision will be sustained on appeal if there
was "an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision . . . "
The trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial will
be reversed only if "the evidence to support the verdict
was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing
as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust."
[Emphasis in original.]
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (1982), quoting McCloud v.
Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977).

A verdict may be set aside

as contrary to the preponderance of the evidence although directed
verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not justified.
McCloud v. Baum, supra, 569 P.2d at 1127 n. 1.
For the reasons discussed at length above, there is insufficient evidence to justify a verdict that Nordstrom acted in "bad
faith" as that concept is defined by Utah law.

In fact, the evi-

dence in this case demonstrates that the jury reached a verdict
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which is unreasonable and unjust. Accordingly, the district court
committed reversible error in denying Nordstrom's motion for new
trial on this ground.
B.

Submitting the Issue of Breach of an Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing to the Jury Constituted
Unfair Surprise to Nordstrom.

As discussed above, the issue of breach of an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing was neither raised in the pleadings
nor tried.

The trial court's submission of the issue to the jury,

if not grounds for reversing the trial court's denial of
Nordstrom's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, at
least constituted an irregularity in the proceedings or a surprise
within the meaning of Rule 59. As a result, Nordstrom is entitled
to a new trial in which the issue of good faith can be properly
developed and decided.
C.

The District Court Erred in Refusing to Instruct the Jury
on Dismissal for Cause.

Nordstrom requested that the district court instruct the jury
concerning dismissal for cause.

R. C82-5828, 642-643. Nordstrom

also submitted a proposed special verdict form which would have
required the jury to determine whether Nordstrom discharged plaintiffs without good cause.

R. C82-5828, 570-571. Over Nordstrom's

objection, the district court refused to give Nordstrom's
requested instructions or to submit the issue of dismissal for
cause to the jury by special verdict.

Tr. Vol. IX, 90. Specifi-

cally, the district court refused to instruct the jury that plaintiffs' terminations were not actionable if made for offenses
-36-
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listed as grounds for immediate termination in Nordstrom History,
Policy and Regulation manual, or for other good cause.
Nordstrom's Requested Instruction No. 34, R. C82-5828, 642. The
district court also failed to instruct the jury that Nordstrom, in
justifying its dismissal of plaintiffs, could rely on grounds
other than those stated at the time of the terminations even if
Nordstrom was unaware of those grounds at that time.

Nordstrom's

Requested Instruction No. 35, R. C82-5828, 643.
Both instructions are based not only on well-established law,
but track the claims of the Knapps' Complaint and Brehany's
Amended Complaint, both of which complain that plaintiffs were
discharged without having committed any violations of the
Nordstrom policy manual.
108.

R. C82-5860, 4-5, 12; R. C82-5828, 5-6,

Even the California courts which have created the broadest

exceptions to the at-will rule recognize that a termination is not
actionable if good cause exists.

Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116

Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1980).
Similarly, it is firmly established that an employer's dismissal of an employee is justified if a sufficient ground for dismissal existed at the time of the discharge, regardless of whether
the employer knew of the ground or not, or whether he had assigned
some other ground as the cause for the dismissal.

Laney v. Oregon

Nurses Assoc., 53 Or. App. 422, 424, 632 P.2d 472, 474-475 (1981);
Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th
Cir. 1954); Marnon v. Vaughn Motor Co., 189 Or. 339, 219 P.2d 163
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-37-

(1950); Haaq v. Revel1, 28 Wash. 2d 883, 184 P.2d 442, 445 (1947);
Restatement (2d) of Contracts, § 237, Illustration 8 at 219
(1981).

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, § 46 at 120-121

(1970).
Both of these instructions were critical in the present case
because the evidence at trial established that plaintiffs had committed violations of the Nordstrom History, Policy and Regulation,
which justified plaintiffs' dismissal.

The manual provides that

an employee may be subject to immediate dismissal if he is, among
other offenses, guilty of (1) providing false information on an
employment application, (2) committing violations of criminal law,
or (3) engaging in "unbecoming conduct bringing reflection or
criticism upon the store."

Ex. D-l.

All three plaintiffs were guilty of such conduct.

Dennis

Knapp admitted supplying false information on his employment
application, and using illegal drugs while in Nordstrom's employ,
including use of marijuana and cocaine in the presence of vendors
on buying trips in San Diego, Seattle and New York.
48-50.

Tr. Vol. II,

He also admitted that Nordstrom employees regularly used

illegal drugs in his presence, including in his home, while he was
general manager in Utah, but that he did nothing to discourage
such use, even though he recognized it to be illegal.
II, 32-35.

Tr. Vol.

Barbara Knapp also admitted to routine illegal drug

use, in Salt Lake City in the presence of other Nordstrom employees and on buying trips to New York in the presence of venders.
Tr. Vol. Ill, 83, 86, 88. Cathy Brehany admitted regularly being

-38-
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in the presence of friends while they used illegal drugs and making introductions for her friends for the purpose of their
obtaining cocaine, which conduct, at a minimum, should be viewed
as "unbecoming."

Tr. Vol. II, 139-140, 151; Vol. Ill, 6-14.

This evidence of plaintiffs' violations of the manual justified submission of the issue of dismissal for cause to the jury.
Both the plaintiffs' complaints, as well as their proposed jury
instructions, recognized that an employer can discharge an
employee for just and sufficient cause.

R. C82-5828, 699. The

district court's refusal to instruct the jury concerning dismissal
for cause in accordance with Nordstrom's proposed instructions was
reversible error.
D.

The District Court Erred in Failing to Adequately Define
the Concept of Good Faith.

Over Nordstrom's objection, the district court failed to give
Nordstrom's Requested Instruction Nos. 64 and 66, which define the
concept of good faith.

Tr. Vol. IX, 91.

Those instructions were

essential to a proper determination of whether Nordstrom acted in
good faith.

Instruction No. 64 stated that Nordstrom acted in

good faith in discharging plaintiffs if it acted on the honest
belief, even if mistaken, that plaintiffs' discharge was required
for legitimate business interests.

R. C82-5828, 588.

It is

well-established that an employer acts in good faith in discharging an employee if an employer's decision is based on reasons the
employer reasonably believes to be true, even if the employer is
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actually mistaken.

Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96,

643 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 (1982).
Instruction No. 66 stated that in determining whether
Nordstrom acted in good faith in discharging plaintiffs, the jury
should exercise care so as not to interfere with the legitimate
exercise in managerial discretion by Nordstrom, and where, as in
this case, the employees occupied sensitive managerial positions,
Nordstrom must of necessity be allowed substantial scope of the
exercise of its subjective judgment.

R. C82-5828, 590.

This

instruction is quoted directly from a decision which recognizes
broad exceptions to the at-will rule, but which at the same time
recognizes an employer's legitimately broad and subjective prerogatives in dealing with high-level management employees such as
plaintiffs.

Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,

171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (1981).
The district court's failure to submit the foregoing instructions to the jury is reversible error.
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POINT III

THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT
THE JURY CONCERNING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, AND
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S AWARD.
A.

The District Court Improperly Instructed the Jury
Regarding the Measure of Damages. Under the Proper
Measure, Plaintiffs are Entitled to No Damages.
Therefore, this Court Should Reverse and Vacate That
Portion of the District Court's Judgment Favoring
Plaintiffs or Order a Remittitur of Damages to $0.00.

The district court ruled on Nordstrom's motion for directed
verdict at the conclusion of the trial.

Tr. Vol. VIII, 99-107.

At that time, the court ruled that the jury should decide whether
Nordstrom breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and that lost wages could not be the measure of damages
for such a breach.

Tr. Vol. VIII, 100-101, 104-105.

The court

ordered that counsel prepare jury instructions accordingly.
Tr. Vol. VIII, 105-107. Notwithstanding the court's ruling, the
following day plaintiffs proposed an instruction which required
the jury to compute damages on the basis of lost wages.
R. C-82-5828, 802. The court adopted that instruction as its
Instruction No. 18. R. C-82-5828, 557. Nordstrom objected to the
instruction.

Tr. Vol. IX, 89-90.

Instruction No. 18 was contrary to the court's own ruling, and
contrary to law.

As at-will employees, plaintiffs had no right to

future employment.

Therefore, the district court's initial ruling

was correct and in harmony with the majority of courts which have
held that an employee for an indefinite term who is wrongfully

-41-
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discharged may not recover damages for lost future salary or benefits.

Jeter v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 791, 792

(W.D. Okla. 1976); Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386
Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982).

Where an employee is hired for

an indefinite term, there is no way to ascertain how long the
employee would have retained the job had the breach not occurred,
and, therefore, there is no way to determine loss of earnings.
Freeman v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R.R. Co., 239 F. Supp.
661, 662 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
If plaintiffs had had contracts for a definite term, their
damages would have been limited to wages lost only for the
unexpired term of their contracts.

See, e.g., Chapin v. Klein,

128 Ariz. 94, 623 P.2d 1250 (1981).

Where plaintiffs had no

agreement of employment for any term, and the duration of their
employment was entirely speculative, it was patently unfair for
them to have been allowed to recover damages for lost wages beyond
what they might have recovered had they bargained for and obtained
a definite term contract.
Even in Massachusetts, one of the few jurisdictions that has
i

allowed any recovery for breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing on termination of an at-will employee, the
courts have held that damages for such a breach may not include
compensation for future services.

McCone v. New England Telephone

and Telegraph Co., 393 Mass. 231, 471 N.E.2d 47 (1984).

In

McCone, the court described recoverable damages as follows:
In awarding damages for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, n[o]ur goal is and has been
-42-
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simply to deny to [the employer] any readily definable,
financial windfall resulting from the denial to [the
employee] of compensation for past services."
Id. at 2408.

This measure of damages is consistent with the

at-will employee's status, but at the same time denies the
employer any financial windfall from a discharge.
Denial of damages for lost wages in the instant case also conforms with the written salary arrangements Nordstrom provided each
of the plaintiffs.

Each plaintiff received a written document

setting forth his or her salary and stating:
The above is effective for the period of assignment
only. Should the manager be separated for any reason,
unless special arrangements are supplied in writing, the
arrangement terminates as well. [Emphasis added].
Plainly, the intent of the foregoing was that regardless of the
reason for discharge, plaintiffs' right to any future salary would
terminate.
There was no evidence of any financial windfall to Nordstrom
resulting from plaintiffs' terminations.

Indeed, plaintiffs' dam-

age evidence consisted entirely of evidence of lost wages and
benefits.

Therefore, there was no evidentiary foundation for any

damage award.

Accordingly, this court should reverse and vacate

the judgment against Nordstrom.
In the alternative, the court should grant a remittitur of
damages to $0.00.

Where, as here, an error in instructions as to

damages is prejudicial to the defendant, and the amount by which
the verdict was increased by the error can be clearly determined,
a remittitur for that amount should be filed.
Damages, § 346 at 450 (1965).

22 Am. Jur. 2d,

Here, but for the district court's
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error in giving Instruction No. 18, plaintiffs could have been
awarded no damages.

Thus, a remittitur of damages to $0.00 is

appropriate.
B.

Even if the District Court Correctly Fixed the Measure of
Damages, the Amount Awarded is Unsupported by the Evidence. Therefore, this Court Should Order a Remittitur
or Grant Nordstrom a New Trial.

Under Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a new trial may
be granted where a jury's damage award is excessive, "appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice," or
where the evidence is insufficient to justify the award.

In the

alternative, remittitur is available where the excessive damage
amount is "capable of definite and accurate ascertainment."
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982).

Assuming the

district court's instruction concerning damages was correct, under
this legal standard this court should order a remittitur or grant
Nordstrom a new trial.
Instruction No. 18, the district court's instruction concerning the measure of damages, provided that such damages were equal
to the total of the "promised and/or reasonably expected salary
for the plaintiffs over the period of termination to the present,
plus 'fringe benefits,'" reduced by the amounts actually earned by
plaintiffs or the amounts plaintiffs reasonably could have been
expected to earn in available employment comparable to their
employment with Nordstrom.

R. C-82-5282, 557. Under this

instruction, the jury's damages award is plainly excessive and
unsupported by the evidence.

-44-
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Dennis Knapp introduced evidence showing his damages totaled
$27,000 per year, representing the difference between his salary
at the time he left Nordstrom, $56,000, and his income at the time
of trial, $29,000. Tr. Vol. II, 9.

Calculating damages at that

rate over the 42 months from the date of Knapp's termination from
Nordstrom through the time of trial, Knapp's damages total $94,500
($2,250 per month x 42 months).

The jury awarded $150,000.

R. C82-5828, 538. This court should order a remittitur of the
excessive amount.
Barbara Knapp claimed she was entitled to damages of $14,000
per year.

Tr. Vol. Ill, 73-74.

That damage amount represented

the sum of her final Nordstrom salary, $24,000, her expected
bonus, $2,000, and the amount she received upon termination from
her profit sharing plan, $6,000, less her current salary,
$18,000.

Tr. Vol. Ill, 73. At the rate she claimed, her damages

total $49,014 ($1,167 per month x 42 months).

The jury awarded

her $80,000. R. C82-5828, 538.
Even giving Barbara Knapp the benefit of the doubt, however,
her $14,000 per year damage claim is excessive.
assumed $6,000 annually in profit sharing.

Her calculation

She testified, how-

ever, that the $6,000 she received upon termination was accumulated over 5 years.

Tr. Vol. Ill, 72, 80-81.

Assuming she would

continue to receive profit sharing at the same rate, $1,200
annually (which is pure speculation, since plaintiffs introduced
no evidence to support any assumptions concerning future profit
sharing), her damage claim should be reduced by $400 per month.
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Computing damages on that basis, her damages total $32,214 ($767
per month x 42 months).

This court should order a remittitur at

least to that amount.
Cathy Brehany computed her damages on the basis of two assumptions:

(1) that her salary would increase 10% each year and

(2) that she would earn 15% of her salary as profit sharing each
year.

Tr. Vol. II, 176-177. She testified her annual salary at

the time she left Nordstrom was $28,000, and computed her projected increases from that base figure.

^Id. Her actual earnings

were set forth in her tax returns for 1981 through 1983.
P-3 and P-4.

Ex. P-2,

She testified her current annual salary, which

started in 1984, was $35,000. Tr. Vol. Ill, 30-31.
Brehany's projected and actual earnings were as follows:
1981

1982

1983

1984

Total

Projected Earnings

$28,000

$30,800

$33,880

$37,268

$129,948

Actual Earnings

$16,686

$25,733

$29,077

$35,000

$106,496

Adding 15% for profit sharing to Brehany's projected salary
over the relevant period, her projected earnings total $149,440.
The difference between that amount and her actual earnings equals
$42,944.

Under Brehany's assumptions, that is the maximum amount

of damages she should have received.

The jury awarded $55,000.

R. C82-5828, 538.

»

Brehany's calculations, however, are based on figures falling
impermissibly into the realm of speculation.
only on speculation cannot be upheld.
953, 956 (Utah 1983).

A damage award based

Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d

Brehany's assumption of 10% annual salary

-46-
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increases is based on her raise for a single year.
175.

Tr. Vol. II,

That is insufficient data to project indefinitely into the

future.
Moreover, Brehany admitted that her profit sharing amount
depended on Nordstrom1s profits. Tr. Vol. Ill, 29-30.

She

offered no evidence, however, to substantiate her assumption that
Nordstrom earned sufficient profits for her to have received 15%
profit sharing each year, even though such figures for the damage
years in question would have been available at the time of trial.
Tr. Vol. II, 175-177. Again, there is no basis in evidence for
the jury to have been entitled to consider the 15% annual profit
sharing figure.
The court should at least determine that Brehany's 10% annual
salary increase assumption is speculative and cannot provide a
basis for damages.

Without such annual increases, allowing

Brehany 15% profit sharing annually, her damages total $22,304.
Eliminating Brehany's profit sharing assumption as well, for which
there was also no factual basis, her damages total $5,504.
Under the measure of damage instruction given by the court,
allowing plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt on all their assumptions, their damages total $186,458 compared to the jury's award
of $285,000.

Eliminating Barbara Knapp's and Cathy Brehany's

impermissibly speculative assumptions, plaintiffs' damages total
$121,718.

Accordingly, even if the district court's measure of

damage instruction is affirmed, this court should order a remittitur or grant Nordstrom a new trial.

-47-
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this court should reverse that
portion of the district court's judgment that is in favor of
plaintiffs and against Nordstrom.

In the alternative, the court

should order a remittitur to $0.00, or such other amount as is
determined by the court, or grant Nordstrom a new trial.
DATED this

/5&day

0f

December, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

AAK^\
Max D. Wheeler

Stephen'J.

By

Hil

^J^CJ^^JS>StanleyYJV Preston
Attorne^ar f o r A p p e l l a n t
Nordstrom, I n c .

- 4 8J. -Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM
1. District Court's Oral Ruling on Motion for Directed Verdict
2.

Special Verdict

3.

Judgment

4.

Order Denying Nordstrom's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict, New Trial or Remittitur

5. Amended Notice of Appeal
6.

Nordstrom's Requested Jury Instruction Nos. 34, 35, 64, 66

7.

Jury Instruction No. 18

8.

Memorandum Decision and Order, Heward v. Western Electric Co.,
Case No. C81-0904W (D. Utah, filed February 18, 1983)
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RECROSS

4A

42R

own income on how many sales took place in that store.
Their pecuniary interests were every bit as keen
as were those of Jim Nordstrom1s in terms of the financial
consequences. Because their own salaries, their own profit
sharing, everything was dependent upon the success of
Nordstroms, the profit, the sales, and that is the reason
why Nordstroms would not tolerate this type of thing in
Utah, because the adverse publicity that could result from
that could damage the sales and the profit of the company.
So even if you want to restrict the conditional
privilege to a pecuniary interest, we have met the burden.
But I submit that there are no cases that hold that that is
the restriction.

Indeed, if you read the Utah cases we have

cited, that is certainly not the case.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That concludes the arguments, then, as
to this motion made by Mr. Wheeler for a directed verdict
against the plaintiffs on the ground and for the reason they
have failed to make out a case on which they can recover and
go to the jury.
The court's labored through this with all of
you for —

what is this, the eighth day? —

eight days of

jury trial. At intermittent times when I have had occasion
to read the cases submitted by Mr. Robinson and Mr. Athay
and Mr. Wheeler, and after having done all that, I have

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1
2

reached a decision.
My decision is this.

First of all # I do not

3

believe that there is any defamation in this case.

4

the commonality of interest between M r . Nordstrom and his

5

managers, that is all the other managers, as such, that there]

6

is a privilege which is protected.

7

manager would be unable to deal with his subordinates or an

8

owner deal with his managers in cases of this kind,

9

stopping the progress of ordinary management-employee

10
11

I think

Were this not so, a

thus

relationships in business.
Second, I believe that there is no contract

12

as a contract is understood by people who write them, being

13

implied specifically, as shown in the Bihlmaier case,

14 I

I am somewhat troubled by the citing of a case

15

t h a t 1 s determined by a motion for summary judgment, as was

16

Bihlmaier, on an issue that has to do with evidence that in

17

the opinion of the plaintiffs ought to be submitted to the

18

jury for specific rulings on special situations, and I

19

think Z agree with M r . Robinson, the Bihlmaier case is

20

distinguishable.

21

Not only that, the employee quit because the

22

employer wouldn't correct a statement to the lender which

23

would allow him to borrow money.

24

was in that action, it should have been the bank for not

25

lending the money.

Maybe the wrong defendant
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But in any event, aside from that# I don't think
there1 s that kind of a contract, but Z do think that the
plaintiffs in this case have the kind of thing that was
written about by our founding fathers in 1774 and '75, when
Madison clearly recognized the right and property and property
and right.

In this court1s judgment there is a right of

good faith dealing which is protected in the courts.
I realize this may be stepping into a new era.
I don't see the case quota, at length written by former
Justice Oakes in this area, as necessarily giving much
light on this specific issue because of its difference
from any of the tort cases that we have talked about, the
school case, or others having this kind of a right specifically. But I believe that this is a right which is protectable, and that if this jury finds that the defendants herein,
Mr. Nordstrom is the agent and authorized officer of
Nordstroms, and in that capacity terminated the employees,
violating that implied contract of good faith dealing,
plaintiffs can recover.
That means that the issue of lost wages is not
an issue. Compensation to the plaintiffs, if any is determined by this jury, must be based on damages they suffered
as a result of the failure on the part of Nordstrom as found
by the jury to act in good faith in dealing with their
management employees, a superior management employee, as
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everyone has said, but for this one thing, Mr. Knapp and
other employees involved in this as plaintiffs, Mrs. Knapp
and Miss Brehaney.
It may be a new furrow is being drawn, but X have
had occasion to think about this, read some of the old
federal papers, analyzed the kind of things we thought were
important in this country as contract and tort law has grown.
I think Judge Pishler was right in excluding
torts.

I think I am absolutely correct in excluding defama-

tion and limiting this lawsuit to implied contract of good
faith dealing, which is employees who do their job expect
to receive from their employer.
I think a lot of red herrings have been drawn
across the jury's path by talking about termination for
wearing the wrong colored dress. I don't think there's any
evidence in this case by any of the people who have testifiedf
that the employer who spends a lot of money training employees would ever do that, would be that irresponsible. But if
he did, of course, that would really be an evidence of what
I am talking about, and I think that could limit you. To getj
into that area in argument

before the jury might be a basis

for declaring a mistrial. I think that is spurious, and I
am not telling you exactly how to argue, and I won't consider]
that.
I think if you argue to the jury that an
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1

employer can terminate anybody for wearing the wrong color

2

of tie, that's not the kind of blackening I am talking

3

about.

4

this court that the jury may look at, that there wasn't

5

s u f f i c ^ n t investigation, there wasn't sufficient work done

6

by M i . Nordstrom to do just what he did, or there is some

7

other way he could have treated these people and he didn't

8

d o it, that is a lack of good faith dealing for his

9

employees, and for that reason they are entitled to be

But if you talk about the evidence that's before

10

compensated, that is an argument that I think is permissible.

11

But going beyond that, I think, is not.

12

A s I have circumscribed this case not only as to

13

its narrow area of being dealth with, which is a new area

14

in the law in this day, but also I am circumscribing the

15

kind of argument I am going to allow you to make to the jury.

16

And that may be a bad faith dealing right there by the court.

17

But that's where I am going on the record on tort law.

18

Now, if you want to look over your instructions

19

and see if we can fashion some instructions to this jury

20

that will allow you to get at that issue, does anybody have

21

any q u e s t i o n s ?

22

D o you have any questions about this, M r . Wheelerj?

23

It was your motion.

£ny question about what I said?

24

understand what I said?

25

MR. WHEELER:

Do you

I think so, Y o u r Honor, except with
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respect to the damages. You say that lost wages could not
be the basis.
THE COURT: That's true.
MR. WHEELER: As far as I know, that's the only
evidence of damages before the jury.
THE COURT: Well# the damages that they plead, as I
read their complaints, indicate whatever damages are mete and
just under circumstances in the old law, but it's fair to
consider the damage to these people, if any, as a result of
that bad faith dealing, if any, which Mr. Nordstrom had
perfectly no ground, it wasnft bad faith to walk in and
terminate them forthwith. If the jury thinks that's okay,
that's okay.

If they think there are some bad faith dealings

then, they can award what they think that's worth in terms
of whatever it's going to amount to as far as Nordstrom is
concerned, they can go that direction. That's the damages.
It's much like a general damage question in
another tort case.

I don't know how you get at the numbers.

Certainly, Mr. Knapp can say that it took him
a long time to get employment.

But that's all defamation.

You can't get into that. His bad dealing is what we are
talking about. And I circumscribed the argument to the jury
to get into that area.

So we are not going to get into

these areas.
I may not retry this case, but I will certainly
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1

d o it if we get outside the boundary I have set.

2

MR. WHEELERt

A s I understand, you are dismissing the

3

defamation claim, but you are allowing the issue to go to the

4

jury on whether the Nordstroms acted in good faith in termi-

5

nating these people.

6

THE C O U R T :

Yes.

A n d I am saying that the agreement

7

which is signed by the employee that's Exhibit N o . 1 indi-

8

cates there will be a good faith, it creates a good faith

9

dealing right which is protectable by the courts and of the

io I kind of property in a right, and that's the property to be
11 I protected which is allowed under these circumstances.
M R . WHEELER:

12

13

Your Honor.

14

instructions.

It may require a little modification of our
I don't think

THE COURT:

15

I think I understand what you are saying,

—

W e l l , there may be, and I am willing to

16 I work with you on any b a s i s ; earlier, later.
17

coming in till 9:00.

18

instructions, now.

19

ably.

20

M R . WHEELER:

21

THE C O U R T :

22

40 instructions.

23

They are not

That's not going to give you a lot of
We are narrowing the case down consider-

It is going to be short.
So you are not going to have to give them
I wouldn't give them that, anyway.

A s a matter of fact, many years ago I was

24

involved in a case where they gave him 60 instructions.

25

They should have had the judge whipped for giving him so
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1

many.

2

Now, the next question on the record, I want

3

to a*k you, M r . Robinson, do you understand what I said?

4

MR. ROBINSON:

5

THE COURT:

M r . Athay?

6

M R . ATHAY:

Yes.

7

THE COURT:

Y o u can have all the time you want.

8

MR. ROBINSON:

9

THE COURT:

11

MR. ROBINSON:

12

THE COURT:

14
15

About 30 minutes before we approach

the court in chambers for instructions?

10

13

Y e s , Your Honor.

Yes.
Y o u need to get them typed.

Do you want to look over your instructions

and see what you can get?
All right.

Do that.

When you get ready, we

will work with you on any basis.

16

This is mostly going to be law work.

17

suggest, unless the Knapps have some real interest in stay-

18

ing in this courtroom, as beautiful «is it is, for two or

19

three hours, and Miss Brehaney and their witness and so on,

20

i don't know if you want to stick around.

21

doing paperwork.

22

MR. ROBINSON:

I would

We will just be

With the court 1 s permission, we will

23

take a ten minute coffee break and get busy and knock on yourj

24

door as soon as we can.

25

THE COURT:

I am not going anyplace.

As I indicated
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before on the record, I am a public servant.

(At 3:10 p.m. a recess was taken
to 10:30 a.m. the following day.)
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INSTRUCTION NO. \

V

SPECIAL VERDICT

Q^fe ^

Deputy Clerk

C%2J2%)22>

We, the jury, find from a preponderance of the evidence
in this case the following answers to the questions propounded
to us:
QUESTION NO. 1:

Have plaintiffs proved by a preponderance

of the evidence that defendant Nordstrom, Inc. acted in bad
faith in terminating their employment?
As to plaintiff Dennis Knapp, answer yes or no

tXl&J

.

As to plaintiff Barbara Knapp, answer yes or no L/jL&J .
As to plaintiff Cathy Brehany, answer yes or no ^ j y / .
If you answered question no. 1 "yes" as to any plaintiff,
then answer question no. 2 as to that plaintiff only.
QUESTION NO. 2:

Did the bad faith act by defendant

Nordstrom, Inc., cause damage to any plaintiff?
As to plaintiff Dennis Knapp, answer yes or no

ij^^

•

As to plaintiff Barbara Knapp, answer yes or no

LLfoJ .

As to plaintiff Cathy Brehany, answer yes or no //g^/ .
If you answered question no. 2 "yes," as to any plaintiff,
then answer question no. 3 as to that plaintiff only.
QUESTION NO. 3:

What amount would reasonably compensate

plaintiff for any damage he or she suffered as a result of
the bad faith act of defendant Nordstrom, Inc.?

P l a i n t i f f Dennis Knapp:
P l a i n t i f f Barbara Knapp:

IfSD.
* %£) »

OOO-OO
DDO-OD

Plaintiff Cathy Brehany: ** ^5^,000-

OQ

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

^38

David K. Robinson of and for
DAVID K. ROBINSON, P.C.
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
770 E South Temple
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 355-3777
Utah S t a t e Bar #2780

'--—V:

V \ o'

-2677

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CATHY BREHANY, AND DENNIS ]
KNAPP, e t a l . ,
})

•».

NORDSTROM, I N C . , e t a l .
Defendants.

trial

before

presiding.

J&J. /96> A/O,
I *5- /S~ —

!
\

Plaintiffs,

These a c t i o n s ,

JUDGMENT

1
])

C i v i l No. C82-5860
C82-5828

]>

JUDGE DEE

having been previously c o n s o l i d a t e d , came on for

t h e C o u r t and a J u r y ,
The i s s u e s

dismissed Plaintiffs'
on D e f e n d a n t s '

The H o n o r a b l e David B. Dee

h a v i n g been duly t r i e d and the Court having

claims for defamation and wrongful termination

Motion for Directed V e r d i c t , and the jury having duly

r e n d e r e d i t s v e r d i c t by Special Verdict on the i s s u e s submitted t o i t ,
whether Defendant
Plaintiffs9

Nordstrom, Inc. acted in bad f a i t h in terminating

e m p l o y m e n t , and whether, and t o what e x t e n t ,

Plaintiffs

suffered damages as a r e s u l t ,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
the

T h a t P l a i n t i f f s take nothing on any of t h e i r claims against

individual

D e f e n d a n t s and that a l l of t h e i r claims against the

individual Defendants be dismissed;
2.

T h a t P l a i n t i f f s take nothing on t h e i r claims for defamation

and w r o n g fDigitized
u l t ebyrthe
m Howard
i n a t iW.
o nHunter
against
Defendant
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Nordstrom,
Law School, BYU. Inc. and that
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

those claims be dismissed;
3.

That P l a i n t i f f ,

Nordstrom,

Inc.,

($150,000.00),
(12Z)

the

with

D e n n i s Knapp, recover of the Defendant,

sum o f One Hundred F i f t y Thousand Dollars
i n t e r e s t thereon at the r a t e of Twelve percent

p e r annum a s p r o v i d e d by l a w ,

and h i s c o s t s of a c t i o n , as

d e t e r m i n e d by t h e Court on h i s claim that Defendant Nordstrom, Inc.
breached an implied covenant of good f a i t h ;
4.

That P l a i n t i f f

B a r b a r a Knapp, recover of the Defendant,

Nordstrom, I n c . , the sum of Eighty Thousand D o l l a r s ( $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) , with
interest

thereon,

at

t h e r a t e of Twelve percent (12Z) per annum as

p r o v i d e d by l a w , and her c o s t s of a c t i o n , as determined by the Court
on h e r c l a i m t h a t

Defendant

Nordstrom,

I n c . breached an implied

covenant of good f a i t h ; and
5.

That P l a i n t i f f ,

Thousand D o l l a r s
Twelve p e r c e n t
action

Cathy Brehany, recover the sum of F i f t y Five

( $ 5 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) , with i n t e r e s t thereon at the r a t e of

( 1 2 Z ) per annum as provided by law, and her c o s t s of

a s d e t e r m i n e d by t h e C o u r t on h e r c l a i m t h a t Defendant

Nordstrom, Inc. breached an implied covenant of good f a i t h .
DATED t h i s < ^ /

day of February, 1985.

BY THE COURT

Approved as toyform:
DATED this t'Y day of February, 1985.

r

A:, ,J/ David K. Robinson

I 'I

(fieto)iiL>

1

Attorney for
Plaintiff
Digitized
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Approved as to form:
DATED this / ^
day of February, 1985.

D. Gilbert Athay
Attorney for Plaintiffs Knapp

Approved as to form:
DATED this^Zo day of February, 1985.

^

Steven O . Hill V
Attorney for Defendant Nordstrom, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed the original to the Clerk of the
District Court for Salt Lake County, at 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111, and a true and correct copy to the persons at the
address shown below on this /V^ day of February, 1985.

/fluu €berf~
Stephen J. Hill, Esq.
and Max D. Wheeler, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
D. Gilbert Athay, Esq.
72 E 400 S #325
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CATHY BREHANY,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
NORDSTROM, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
DENNIS KNAPP and BARBARA
KNAPP, his wife,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Nos. C82-5828
C82-5860
(Judge Dee)

vs.
NORDSTROM, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

This matter came on for hearing on the Motion of
defendant Nordstrom, Inc. for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict, New Trial or Remittitur on March 15, 1985.
The Court having considered the oral argument of counsel,
the memorandum submitted by defendant in favor of its
motions, the files and records herein, and being fully
advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion of Defendant
Nordstrom, Inc. for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,
New Trial or Remittitur is denied.
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DATED this

f^L day of September, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

£k&A

;^g-

District Judge

AXJpST

H.D'^C^H'FN'DL^Y

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

0

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Stephen J. Hill
Attorneys for Defendant
Nordstrom, Inc.
ATHAY AND ASSOCIATES

fT Gilbert Athay
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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FILED !N C! f RK'S OmCE

SEP
MAX D .

17 3 us PM ^ 5

WHEELER

STEPHEN J. HILL
STANLEY J. PRESTON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Nordstrom
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CATHY BREHANY,
Plaintiff,
AMENDED NOTICE
OF APPEAL

vs.
NORDSTROM, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
DENNIS KNAPP and BARBARA
KNAPP, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NORDSTROM, INC., et al.,

Civil Nos. C82-5860
C82-5828
(Judge Dee)

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
defendant Nordstrom, Inc. ("Nordstrom") hereby gives
notice of appeal. Nordstrom appeals from that portion
of the Judgment of this Court entered on February 21, 1985,
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A

which is in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant
Nordstrom, Inc., including but not limited to that portion
of the judgment which awards damages and costs to plaintiffs against defendant Nordstrom, Inc. Nordstrom also
appeals from the Court's order entered on September 12,
1985, denying Nordstrom1s Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, New Trial or
Remittitur.

This appeal is taken from the District Court

of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County
State of Utah, and is taken to the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah.
DATED this 17th day of September, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

^L^^ /-Mi

Max D'. Wheeler
Stephen J. Hill
Stanley J. Preston
Attorneys for Defendant
Nordstrom, Inc.
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss
)

Nancy Hughes, being duly sworn, says that she is
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, attorneys for

defendant Nordstrom, Inc.

herein; that she served the attached

Amended Notice

pf Appeal
(Case Number

C82-5860
C82-5828

,

Salt Lake

County)

upon the parties listed below by placing a true and
correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
D. Gilbert Athay
Athay and Associates
72 East 400 South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage
prepaid, on the 17th day of

, 1985.

September

ftamAu tkqhajb
NancyHugiesQ
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s
fippfpmhgr

1 7 t h day o f

, 1985.

Ckt/ iJfrfa^n
Notary/Public
Residing in the State of Utah
My Commission
Digitized by the Expires:
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INSTRUCTION NO.

I1/

The policy manual of defendant Nordstrom, Inc., entitled
•Nordstrom History, Policy & Regulations,11 does not give rise
to a binding employment contract between defendant Nordstrom,
Inc., and plaintiffs.

Dnelss you find there was an express or

implied agreement between defendant Nordstrom, Inc., and each
of the plaintiffs as to a definite term of employment, defendant
Nordstrom, Inc., was entitled to terminate plaintiffs' employment
at any time for any reason.

If you do find such an agreement

for a definite term of employment, defendant Nordstrom, Inc.,
could terminate plaintiffs' employment for the reasons listed
in its policy manual and also for other reasons not listed in
the manual, provided there was good cause for the terminations.

Gates y. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982);
Heideck v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del.
1982); Mau v. Omaha National Bank, 299 N.W.2d 147 (Neb. 1980);
Johnson v. National Beef PackinlpCo., 551 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1976);
Bihlmeir v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); Shaw v. S. S.
Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. App. 1975).
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INSTRUCTION NO.

33

In justifying its dismissal of plaintiffs, defendant
Nordstrom, Inc., can rely on grounds for dismissal other than
those stated at the time of the terminations, even though
defendant Nordstrom, Inc., was unaware of those grounds at
the time of the terminations, so long as those grounds
existed at the time plaintiffs were discharged.

Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th
Cir. 1954); Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 189 Or. 339, 219 P.2d
163 (1950); 53 Am. Jur. 2d, "Master and Servant," § 46 at 120121; Restatement, Second, Contracts, S 237, Illustration 8, at
p. 219.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

^"

l,H.>'ii "i • "jrdstrom, Inc., acted in good faith in
terminating plaintiffs' employment if it acted on
belief, even if mistaken
regu

tiffs' discharge was

legitimate business interests.

Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276
(1982); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d. 311, 171
Cal. Rptr. 937 (1981).
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO

. 18
i a ease •uc k -s

measure of damages for '
this

" u ~ i r o m i s e d and/or r e a s o n a b l y expected salary
plaintiffs

over the

*

tie present, of the

"i

t h e y were entitled to as employees of

Nordstrom, including, biit: not necessarily limited t
bonus payaen

plans, health insruance and accident

insurance.
T h i s amount

reduced by tho

tn

'v earned by

amounts p l a i n t i f f s could have reasonably been

expectec

other available employment with an empoloye

comparable s i z e repu?

the r e t a i l fashion

ordstrom, Inc.
ff are not to be penalized if, using <
were unabl#
reputation

gen •

• ney

emj^&Lyer of comparable s i z e ,
c l i e n t e l e as Nordstrom, Inc., for in that case, such

employment is not available.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OP UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
N. ENOS HEWARD,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

-vsCivil No:

C-81-0904W

WESTFPN ELECTPIC COMPANY,
INCORPORATED,
Defendant,

Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judqment and
defendant's motion for summary judgment were orally arqued on
February 1, 1983.

Plaintiff was represented by Lynn P. Feward

and defendant was represented by Chris Wanasqard.

Plaintiff's

motion, seeking a ruling that the provisions of 29 U.S.C,
5 626(d) requirinq exhaustion of state and administrative
remedies have been met, and that the age discrimination issue is
ripe for determination, was acknowledqed by the defendant and
granted.

Defendant's motion for summary judqment was taken under

advisement.

The court has since reviewed the memoranda of

counsel and pertinent cited authorities.

Based on the foreaoina

the court renders the followinq decision.
The primary question for resolution in this case is
whether the plaintiff was dismissed from the defendant's employ
because of his aqe in violation of the Aqe Discrimination
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. $S 621 et seq.

That Act provides that
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•It shall be unlawful for an employ*
individual because

-

...

individual's age,

S 623(a)i

29 U.S.C.

ntends plaintiff hasn't met its

burden of presenting a prima facie case def i I'linri ill lllhii

r u n the plaint, i! i a

i' ! Ji| I: he i r arquments using the four-part

analysis of McDonnell Douglas corp« v, Green»
(1973), though such an extensive showinq
ADF A ca s e •

f

not necessary for an

S e e McCuen \ . Home m Insurance Company, 633 F • 2d 1150

(5th Cir, 1981) (even if a plaintiff cannot make - McDonnell
Douqlas type showing, he nay still recover if he can show he was
discharged

foeca

Indeed, the McDonnell test "was

never intended to be the onl
r * otherwise

mid fatie t^M

for disci i

imi^i -*

McCorstin v, nnited States Steel Corp.,

621 F.2d 749 (5th

rehearing denied „ f ;• 7 F 2d 239

accord, Stanoiev v« Fbasco Services, Inc. f 643 F.2d 914 (2ne
1981) ; Loeb v. Texti

,M •

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
facie case

'un.ia

flexible standard that may differ according to

d i fIri i

" 1111

4

-

-

See also

Furnco Construction Corp, v» Waters,
A plaintiff suing for wronqful dismissal under ADEA has
a prima faci

that but for I he plaintiff's

age the plaintiff would not .have been terminated.

Mortensei » t .'
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Callaway, 672 F.2d 822, 823 (10th Cir. 1982)? Bentley v,
Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 638 F.2d 9 (2nd Cir. 1981)j Smith v.
University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980);
Smithers v. Railar, 629 F.2d 892 (4th Cir. 1980)? Cleverly v.
Western Electric Company, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Miss.
1978); Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299
(F.D. Mich. 1976).
After carefully reviewinq the record the court is of
the opinion a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Specifically, circumstantial evidence raises a question of fact
whether plaintiff was treated differently than vounqer employees
were beina treated and whether plaintiff was subsequently
dismissed because of his aae.

Summary judqment, therefore, is

not appropriate and the matter should be submitted to the jury.
Several questions of law remain to be decided, thouqh,
one of which is whether the implied contractual obliqations
alleaed in plaintiff's second and third causes of action are
leqally coanizable under Utah law.

Plaintiff•essentially

contends the defendant in failinq to afford the plaintiff the
process reouired to dismiss him breached an implied covenant of
qood faith and fair dealinq.

After a review of the cases cited

by both plaintiff and defendant, the court must conclude Utah law
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does not recognize plaintiff's implied contract claimf
actionab

ltcially

where the plaintiff's employment contract

is indefinite as to duration
Other leqal Questions which remain, as discussed
February

concern various remedies

the

The

Questions reqarding liquidated damages and at, I i i i \. l^tf:
I

reserved pendinq the outcome of the trial

punitive damaaes are recovei

* I i i

I designed

!

e v i d e n c e at tiial

b e awarded foi

"" " | > rive d a m a q e s

violation

Employment A i

• Discrimination

weiqht

however, would foreclose

authority and reasc

of punit

the potential under the Act for

?

damages, which

x

. icruidated

penalty

seems

inconaruous to also allow an award of punitive damages.
hi |>| pwpnt to 24

808 5

Application

T

Pee

'"Construction

Employment Art of 1967.

Accordingly,

IP HEPERY ORDFPFI flefenda*

II summary judgment is qranted
third causes

« »'h

afford broad r e l i e f , t h e court

"'is also aware t h e courts are s;
ti

Whether

^termined now a? it

'could affect counsels 1 presentation
i

i

plaintiff f s second
plaintiffs first
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cause of action.

The question of whether defendant's actions in

terminating the plaintiff violated the Age Discrimination
Employment Act is reserved for a jury's determination.
Dated this

day of Pebruaryf 19B3.

:

1

\k'<tJh<({' 'v<( ('-\
David K. Vinaer"
United States District Judae
Mailed a copy of the foreqoinq Memorandum Decision and
Order to the following named counsel this

'{

day of February,

1983.
Lynn P. Heward, E S Q .
1174 East 2700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Chris Wanqsqard, Fso.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400

-w/

fcix

Secretary u
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that T caused four true and correct copies
K \e foregoing Brief rf Appellant to be served by first cla
* i ,

mi Deeembi? i:

I

t l le

f ::>] I ow i IM| :

D. Gilbert Athay
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents
72 East Fourth South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 1
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